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Abstract   
 
After half a century in oblivion, the nature of consciousness is now the hottest topic in the behavioral sciences 
and philosophy. Beginning with the pioneering work of Ludwig Wittgenstein in the 1930’s (the Blue and Brown 
Books) and from the 50’s to the present by his logical successor John Searle, I have created the following table as 
an heuristic for furthering this study. The rows show various aspects or ways of studying and the columns show 
the involuntary processes and voluntary behaviors comprising the two systems (dual processes) of the Logical 
Structure of Consciousness (LSC), which can also be regarded as the Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR-Searle), 
of behavior (LSB), of personality (LSB), of reality (LSOR), of Intentionality (LSI) -the classical philosophical term, 
the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness (DPC) , the Descriptive Psychology of Thought (DPT) –or better, the 
Language of the Descriptive Psychology of Thought (LDPT), terms introduced here and in my other very recent 
writings. I will make minimal comments here since those wishing further description may consult my articles 
and reviews of books by Wittgenstein, Searle and others on academia.edu, philpapers.org, vixra.org and on 
Amazon. 
After half a century in oblivion, the nature of consciousness is now the hottest topic in the behavioral 
sciences and philosophy.  Beginning with the pioneering work of Ludwig Wittgenstein in the 1930’s (the 
Blue and Brown Books) and from the 50’s to the present by his logical successor John Searle, I have 
created the following table as an heuristic for furthering this study.  The rows show various aspects or 
ways of studying and the columns show the involuntary processes and voluntary behaviors  comprising  
the two systems (dual processes) of  the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), which can also be 
regarded as the Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR-Searle), of behavior (LSB), of  personality (LSB), of 
reality (LSOR), of Intentionality (LSI) -the classical philosophical term, the Descriptive Psychology of 
Consciousness (DPC) , the Descriptive Psychology of  Thought (DPT) –or better,  the Language of the 
Descriptive Psychology of Thought (LDPT), terms introduced here and in my other very recent writings.   
I will make minimal comments here since those wishing further description may consult my articles and 
reviews of books by Wittgenstein, Searle and others on academia.edu, philpapers.orgvixra.org  and on 
Amazon.  
This table comes from work by Wittgenstein and  and a much simpler table by Searle as revised and 
expanded by myself. The last 9 rows come principally from decision research by Johnathan St. B.T. Evans 
and colleagues as revised by myself.   
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind (LSM), the Logical Structure of 
Behavior (LSB), the Logical Structure of Thought (LST), the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the 
Logical Structure of Personality (LSP), the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness (DSC), the Descriptive 
Psychology of Higher Order Thought (DPHOT), Intentionality-the classical philosophical term. 
revised by myself.  
     (Involuntary –automated-Rules  R1)   Thinking (Cognition)(No gaps)               (Voluntary-deliberative- Rules R2) Willing (Volition)(3 gaps)  
                       Dispositions*         Emotions           Memory          Perception            Desires               PI**                IA***            Actions/Words  
 Cause Originates From****   World           World     World        World                 Mind             Mind        Mind             Mind 
 Causes Changes In*****  None               Mind      Mind          Mind                 None         World        World           World 
 Causally Self Reflexive******  No         Yes       Yes          Yes             No                    Yes         Yes                Yes    
True or False(Testable)   Yes       T only     T only        T only            Yes                    Yes         Yes                       Yes   
          
Public Conditions of Satisfaction Yes                        Yes/No     Yes/No           No           Yes/No             Yes         No                      Yes 
Describe a Mental State  No        Yes       Yes           Yes             No                 No       Yes/No            Yes 
Evolutionary Priority   5           4          2,3            1               5                        3                     2               2 
Voluntary Content  Yes         No        No           No             No                Yes                Yes                        Yes 
Voluntary Initiation    Yes/No        No        Yes           No                    Yes/No              Yes                 Yes                       Yes 
Cognitive System *******      2          1          2/1             1            2 / 1                    2            1               2   
Change Intensity   No        Yes        Yes         Yes            Yes                      No                 No                        No   
Precise Duration   No        Yes        Yes         Yes             No                      No                 Yes                      Yes 
Time,Place(H+N,T+T)***** ***    TT                           HN                     HN                       HN                        TT                        TT                  HN                       HN 
Special Quality   No        Yes         No          Yes            No                        No                  No                       No 
Localized in  Body    No        No          No          Yes            No                        No                  No                      Yes 
Bodily Expressions   Yes        Yes          No           No            Yes                      Yes                 Yes                      Yes 
Self Contradictions    No        Yes          No           No            Yes                      No                  No                        No 
Needs a Self    Yes                        Yes/No          No           No            Yes                      No                   No                       No 
Needs Language   Yes          No          No           No            No                       No                   No                     Yes/No 
     FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
Subliminal Effects   No                          Yes/No           Yes           Yes            No                        No                  No                      Yes/No 
Associative/Rule Based   RB        A/RB            A             A           A/RB                     RB                  RB                          RB  
Context Dependent/Abstract  A        CD/A            CD            CD           CD/A                       A                CD/A                     CD/A  
Serial/Parallel    S          S/P             P             P             S/P                         S                    S                S 
Heuristic/Analytic   A          H/A             H             H            H/A                         A                    A                 A 
Needs Working Memory  Yes           No            No             No             No                        Yes                  Yes                       Yes 
General Intelligence Dependent Yes           No            No             No        Yes/No                     Yes                  Yes                       Yes 
Cognitive Loading Inhibits  Yes                         Yes/No            No             No                     Yes                       Yes                   Yes                      Yes 
Arousal Facilitates or Inhibits  I         F/I             F                 F                       I                   I                        I                  I 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2  are often referred to by Searle and others as COS, 
Representations,  truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while the automatic results of S1 are 
designated as presentations by others ( or COS1 by myself). 
*  Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible actions etc. 
**     Searle’s  Prior Intentions 
 ***  Searle’s Intention In Action  
**** Searle’s Direction of Fit 
***** Searle’s Direction of Causation 
****** (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills  Itself).  Searle formerly call this causally self-
referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive systems.   
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
It is of interest to compare this with the various tables and charts in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes 
on Human Nature. One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have 
described the possible uses (meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of language in a 
particular context, we have exhausted its interest, and attempts at explanation (i.e., philosophy)  only 
get us further away from the truth. He showed us that there is only one philosophical problem—the 
use of sentences (language games) in an inappropriate context, and hence only one solution—
showing the correct context.  
EXPLANATION OF THE TABLE   System 1 (i.e., emotions, memory, perceptions, reflexes) which parts of 
the brain present to consciousness, are automated and generally happen in less than 500msec, while 
System 2 is abilities to perform slow deliberative actions that are represented in conscious 
deliberation (S2D-my terminology)  requiring over 500msec, but frequently repeated S2 actions can 
also become automated  (S2A-my terminology). There is a gradation of consciousness from coma 
through the stages of sleep to full awareness.  Memory includes short term memory (working 
memory) of system 2 and long term memory of System 1. For volitions one would usually say they are 
successful or not, rather than true or false.  S1 is causally self-reflexive since the description of our 
perceptual experience-the presentation of our senses to consciousness, can only be described  in the 
same words (as the same COS - Searle) as we describe the world, which I prefer to call the percept or  
COS1 to distinguish it from the representation or public COS2 of S2. 
Of course the various rows and columns are logically and psychologically connected. E.g., Emotion, 
Memory and Perception in the True or False row will be True only, will describe a mental state, belong 
to cognitive system 1, will not generally be initiated voluntarily, are causally self-reflexive, cause 
originates in the world and causes changes in the mind, have a precise duration, change in intensity, 
occur here and now, commonly have a special quality, do not need language, are independent of 
general intelligence and working memory, are not inhibited by cognitive loading, will not have 
voluntary content, and will not have public conditions of satisfaction etc.  
There will always be ambiguities because the words (concepts, language games) cannot precisely 
match the actual complex functions of the brain (behavior), that is, there is a combinatorial explosion 
of contexts (in sentences and in the world), and this is why it’s not possible to reduce higher order 
behavior to a system of laws which would have to state all the possible contexts –hence 
Wittgenstein’s warnings against theories.  
About a million years ago primates evolved the ability to use their throat muscles to make complex 
series of noises (i.e., primitive speech) to describe present events (perceptions, memory, reflexive 
actions) with some Primary or Primitive Language Games (PLG’s).  System 1 is comprised of fast, 
automated, subcortical, nonrepresentational, causally self-referential, intransitive, informationless, 
true-only mental states with a precise time and location) and over time there evolved in higher 
cortical centers S2 with the further ability to describe displacements in space and time of events  (the 
past and future and often hypothetical, counterfactual, conditional or fictional preferences, 
inclinations or dispositions-the Secondary or Sophisticated Language Games (SLG’s) of System 2 that 
are slow, cortical, conscious, information containing, transitive (having public Conditions of 
Satisfaction-Searle’s term for truthmakers or meaning which I divide into COS1 and COS2 for private 
S1 and public S2), representational (which I again divide into R1 for S1 representations and R2 for S2) , 
true or false propositional thinking, with all S2 functions having no precise time and being abilities and 
not mental states. Preferences are Intuitions, Tendencies, Automatic Ontological Rules, Behaviors, 
Abilities, Cognitive Modules, Personality Traits, Templates, Inference Engines, Inclinations, Emotions 
(described by Searle as agitated desires), Propositional Attitudes (correct only if used to refer to 
events in the world and not to propositions), Appraisals, Capacities, Hypotheses.  Some Emotions are 
slowly developing and changing results of  S2 dispositions (W Remarks on the Philosophy of 
Psychology V2 p148) while others are typical S1— automatic and fast to appear and disappear.  “I 
believe”, “he loves”, “they think” are descriptions of possible public acts typically displaced in 
spacetime.  My first person statements about myself are true-only (excluding lying) –i.e. S1, while 
third person statements about others are true or false –i.e., S2 (see my reviews of Johnston 
‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’ and of Budd ‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Psychology’). 
“Preferences” as a class of intentional states --opposed to perceptions, reflexive acts and memories-- 
were first clearly described by Wittgenstein (W) in the 1930’s and termed “inclinations” or 
“dispositions”.  They have commonly been termed “propositional attitudes” since Russell but this is a 
misleading phrase since believing, intending, knowing , remembering etc., are often not 
propositionsal nor attitudes, as has been shown e.g., by W and by Searle (e.g., cf Consciousness and 
Language p118).  They are intrinsic, observer independent public representations (as opposed to 
presentations or representations of System 1 to System 2 – Searle-C+L p53).  They are potential acts 
displaced in time or space, while the evolutionarily more primitive S1 perceptions memories and 
reflexive actions are always here and now.  This is one way to characterize System 2 -the second  
major advance in vertebrate psychology after System 1—the ability to represent events and to  think 
of them as occurring in another place or time (Searle’s third faculty of counterfactual imagination 
supplementing cognition and volition). S1 ‘thoughts’ (my T1) are potential or unconscious mental 
states of S1 --Searle-- Phil Issues 1:45-66(1991). 
Perceptions, memories and reflexive (automatic) actions can be described by primary LG’s ( PLG’s --
e.g., I see the dog) and there are, in the normal case, NO TESTS possible so they can be True Only.  
Dispositions can be described as secondary LG’s ( SLG’s –e.g. I believe I see the dog) and must also be 
acted out, even for me in my own case (i.e., how do I KNOW what I believe, think, feel until I act or 
some event occurs—see my reviews of the well known books on W by Johnston  and Budd.  Note well 
that Dispositions become Actions when spoken or written as well as being acted out in other ways, 
and these ideas are all due to Wittgenstein (mid 1930’s) and are NOT Behaviorism (Hintikka & 
Hintikka 1981, Searle, Hacker, Hutto etc.,).  Wittgenstein can be regarded as the founder of 
evolutionary psychology and his work a unique investigation of the functioning of our axiomatic 
System 1 psychology and its interaction with System 2.  After Wittgenstein laid the groundwork for 
the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order Thought in the Blue and Brown Books in the early 30’s, it 
was extended by John Searle, who made a simpler version of this table in his classic book Rationality 
in Action (2001).  It expands on W’s survey of the axiomatic structure of evolutionary psychology 
developed from his very first comments in 1911 and so beautifully laid out in his last work ‘On 
Certainty’ (OC) (written in 1950-51).  OC is the foundation stone of behavior or  epistemology and 
ontology (arguably the same as are semantics and pragmatics), cognitive linguistics or Higher Order 
Thought, and in my view (shared e.g., by DMS) the single most important work in philosophy 
(descriptive psychology) and thus in the study of  behavior.  Perception, Memory, Reflexive actions 
and Emotion are primitive partly Subcortical Involuntary Mental States, that can be described in 
PLG’s, in which the mind automatically fits (presents) the world (is Causally Self Reflexive--Searle)--the 
unquestionable, true-only, axiomatic basis of rationality over which no control is possible).  
Preferences, Desires, and Intentions are descriptions of slow thinking conscious Voluntary Abilities—
that can be described in SLG’s-- in which the mind tries to fit (represent) the world.  Behaviorism and 
all the other confusions of our default descriptive psychology (philosophy) arise because we cannot 
see S1 working and describe all actions as SLG’s (The Phenomenological Illusion—TPI—Searle). W 
understood this and described it with unequalled clarity with hundreds of examples of language (the 
mind) in action throughout his works.  Reason has access to memory and so we use consciously 
apparent but often incorrect reasons to explain behavior (the Two Selves or Systems or Processes of 
current research).  Beliefs and other Dispositions can be described as thoughts which try to match the 
facts of the world (mind to world direction of fit), while Volitions are intentions to act (Prior 
Intentions—PI, or Intentions In Action-IAA-Searle) plus acts which try to match the world to the 
thoughts—world to mind direction of fit—cf. Searle e.g., C+L p145, 190).   
Sometimes there are gaps in reasoning to arrive at belief and other dispositions. Disposition words 
can be used as nouns which seem to describe mental states (‘my thought is…’) or as verbs or 
adjectives to describe abilities (agents as they act or might act -‘I think that…) and are often 
incorrectly called “Propositional Attitudes”.  Perceptions become Memories and our innate programs 
(cognitive modules, templates, inference engines of S1) use these to produce Dispositions—(believing, 
knowing, understanding, thinking, etc.,-actual or potential public acts (language, thought, mind)  also 
called Inclinations, Preferences, Capabilities, Representations of S2) and Volition -and there is no 
language (concept, thought) of private mental states for thinking or willing (i.e., no private language, 
thought or mind).  Higher animals can think and will acts and to that extent they have a public 
psychology.  
Perceptions: (X is True):  Hear, See, Smell, Pain, Touch, temperature      
Memories:  Remembering (X was true) 
Preferences, Inclinations, Dispositions (X  might become True) : 
CLASS 1: Propositional (True or False) public acts of Believing, Judging, Thinking, Representing, 
Understanding, Choosing, Deciding, Preferring, Interpreting, Knowing (including skills and abilities), 
Attending (Learning), Experiencing, Meaning, Remembering, Intending, Considering, Desiring , 
Expecting, Wishing , Wanting, Hoping( a special class), Seeing As (Aspects), 
CLASS 2: DECOUPLED MODE-(as if, conditional, hypothetical, fictional) - Dreaming , Imagining, Lying, 
Predicting, Doubting  
CLASS 3: EMOTIONS: Loving, Hating, Fearing, Sorrow, Joy, Jealousy, Depression.  Their function is to 
modulate Preferences to increase inclusive fitness (expected maximum utility) by facilitating 
information processing of perceptions and memories for rapid action. There is some separation 
between S1 emotions such as rage and fear and S2 such as love, hate, disgust and anger.  We can 
think of them as strongly felt or acted out desires. 
DESIRES: ( I want X to be True—I want to change the world to fit my thoughts) : Longing, Hoping, 
Expecting, Awaiting, Needing, Requiring, obliged to do    
INTENTIONS: (I will make X True)  Intending    
ACTIONS (I am making X True) :  Acting,  Speaking , Reading,  Writing,  Calculating, Persuading, 
Showing, Demonstrating, Convincing, Doing  Trying,  Attempting, Laughing, Playing, Eating, Drinking, 
Crying,  Asserting (Describing, Teaching, Predicting, Reporting), Promising , Making or Using Maps, 
Books, Drawings, Computer Programs–these are Public and Voluntary and transfer Information to 
others so they dominate over  the Unconscious, Involuntary and Informationless S1 reflexes in 
explanations of  behavior (The Phenomenological Illusion, The Blank Slate or the SSSM). 
Words express actions having various functions in our life and are not the names of objects nor of a 
single type of event. The social interactions of humans are governed by cognitive modules—roughly 
equivalent to the scripts or schemata of social psychology (groups of neurons organized into inference 
engines), which, with perceptions and memories, lead to the formation of preferences which lead to 
intentions and then to actions.  Intentionality or intentional psychology can be taken to be all these 
processes or only preferences leading to actions and in the broader sense is the subject of cognitive 
psychology or cognitive neurosciences when including neurophysiology, neurochemistry and 
neurogenetics. Evolutionary psychology can be regarded as the study of all the preceding functions or 
of the operation of the modules which produce behavior, and is then coextensive in evolution, 
development and individual action with preferences, intentions and actions.  Since the axioms 
(algorithms or cognitive modules) of our psychology are in our genes, we can enlarge our 
understanding and increase our power by giving clear descriptions of how they work and can extend 
them (culture) via biology, psychology, philosophy (descriptive psychology), math, logic, physics, and 
computer programs, thus making them faster and more efficient.   Hajek(2003) gives an analysis of 
dispositions as conditional probabilities which are algorithmatized by R & L(1999), Spohn etc.    
Intentionality (cognitive or evolutionary psychology) consists of various aspects of behavior which are 
innately programmed into cognitive modules which create and require consciousness, will and self,  
and in normal human adults nearly all except perceptions and some memories are purposive, require 
public acts (e.g., language), and commit us to relationships in order to increase our inclusive fitness 
(maximum expected utility or Bayesian utility maximization. Bayesianism is highly questionable due 
to severe underdetermination-i.e., it can ‘explain’ anything and hence nothing.  This occurs via 
dominance and reciprocal altruism, often resulting in Desire Independent Reasons for Action (Searle)- 
which I divide into DIRA1 and DIRA2 for S1 and S2) and imposes Conditions of Satisfaction on 
Conditions of Satisfaction (Searle)-(i.e., relate thoughts to the world  via public acts (muscle 
movements) producing math, language, art, music, sex, sports etc.  The basics of this were figured out 
by our greatest natural psychologist Ludwig Wittgenstein from the 1930’s to 1951 but with clear 
foreshadowings back to 1911, and with refinements by many, but above all by John Searle beginning 
in the 1960’s.  “The general tree of psychological phenomena. I strive not for exactness but for a view 
of the whole.” RPP Vol 1 p895 cf Z p464.  Much of intentionality  (e.g., our language games) admits of 
degrees.  As W noted, inclinations are sometimes conscious and deliberative.  All our templates 
(functions, concepts, language games) have fuzzy edges in some contexts as they must to be useful.  
There are at least two types of thinking (i.e., two language games or ways of using the dispositional 
verb “thinking“)—nonrational without awareness and rational with partial awareness(W), now 
described as the fast and slow thinking of S1 and S2.  It is useful to regard these as language games 
and not as mere phenomena (W RPP Vol2 p129).  Mental phenomena (our subjective or internal 
“experiences”) are epiphenomenal, lack criteria, hence lack info even for oneself and thus can play no 
role in communication, thinking or mind.  Thinking like all dispositions lacks any test, is not a mental 
state (unlike perceptions of S1), and contains no information until it becomes a public act or event 
such as in speech, writing or other muscular contractions.  Our perceptions and memories can have 
information (meaning-i.e., a public COS) only when they are manifested in public actions, for only 
then do thinking, feeling etc. have any meaning (consequences) even for ourselves.  
Memory and perception are integrated by modules into dispositions which become psychologically 
effective when they are acted upon—i.e., S1 generates S2.   Developing language means manifesting 
the innate ability of advanced humans to substitute words (fine contractions of oral or manual 
muscles) for acts (gross contractions of arm and leg muscles).  TOM (Theory of Mind ) is much better 
called UA-Understanding of Agency  (my term) and UA1 and UA2 for such functions in S1 and S2  –and 
can also be called Evolutionary Psychology or Intentionality--the innate genetically programmed 
production of consciousness, self, and thought which leads to intentions and then to actions by 
contracting muscles.  Thus, “propositional attitude” is an incorrect term for normal intuitive 
deliberative S2D or automated S2A speech and action.   We see that the efforts of cognitive science to 
understand thinking, emotions etc. by studying neurophysiology is not going to tell us anything more 
about how the mind (thought, language) works (as opposed to how the brain works) than we already 
know, because “mind” (thought,  language) is already in full public view (W).  Any ‘phenomena’ that 
are hidden in neurophysiology, biochemistry , genetics, quantum mechanics, or string theory, are as 
irrelevant to our social life as the fact that a table is composed of atoms which “obey” (can be 
described by) the laws of physics and chemistry is to having lunch on it.  As W so famously said 
“Nothing is hidden”.  Everything of interest about the mind (thought, language) is open to view if we 
only examine carefully the workings of language.  Language (mind, public speech connected to 
potential actions) was evolved to facilitate social interaction and thus the gathering of resources, 
survival and reproduction.  Its grammar (i.e., evolutionary psychology, intentionality) functions 
automatically and is extremely confusing when we try to analyze it.   
Words and sentences have multiple uses depending on context.  I believe and I eat have profoundly 
different roles as do I believe and I believed or I believe and he believes.  The present tense first 
person use of inclinational verbs such as “I believe” normally describe my ability to predict my 
probable acts based on knowledge (i.e., S2) but can also seem (in philosophical contexts) to be 
descriptive of my mental state and so not based on knowledge or information (W and see my review 
of the book by Hutto and Myin).  In the former S1 sense, it does not describe a truth but makes itself 
true in the act of saying it --i.e., “I believe it’s raining” makes itself true.  That is, disposition verbs used 
in first person present tense can be causally self-reflexive--they instantiate themselves but then they 
are not testable (i.e., not T or F, not S2).  However past or future tense or third person use--“I 
believed” or “he believes”  or “he will believe’ contain or can be resolved by information that is true 
or false, as they describe public acts that are or can become verifiable.   Likewise, “I believe it’s 
raining” has no information apart from subsequent actions, even for me, but “I believe it will rain” or 
“he will think it’s raining” are potentially verifiable public acts displaced in spacetime that intend to 
convey information (or misinformation).   
Nonreflective or Nonrational (automatic) words spoken without Prior Intent (which I call S2A—i.e., 
S2D automated by practice) have been called Words as Deeds by W & then by Daniel Moyal-Sharrock 
in her paper in Philosophical Psychology in 2000).   Many so-called 
Inclinations/Dispositions/Preferences/Tendencies/Capacities/Abilities are Non-Propositional ( 
NonReflective) Attitudes (far more useful to call them functions or abilities) of System 1 (Tversky and 
Kahnemann).  Prior Intentions are stated by Searle to be Mental States and hence S1, but again I think 
one must separate PI1 and PI2 since in our normal language our prior intentions are the conscious 
deliberations of S2. Perceptions, Memories, type 2 Dispositions (e.g., some emotions) and many Type 
1 Dispositions are better called Reflexes of S1 and are automatic, nonreflective, NON-Propositional 
and NON-Attitudinal functioning of the hinges (axioms, algorithms) of our Evolutionary Psychology 
(Moyal-Sharrock after Wittgenstein).  
 
